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Abstract
The present paper studies the growth and eﬃciency consequences of tax-favored
individual retirement accounts in a general equilibrium overlapping generations
model with idiosyncratic lifespan and labor income uncertainty. We distinguish
between economies with rational and with hyperbolic consumers and compare the
consequences of mandatory and voluntary retirement plans with and without annu-
itized beneﬁts. While a full taxation of capital income yields the highest eﬃciency
gains in the rational consumer model, annuitization and hyperbolic discounting sub-
stantially improve the economic eﬃciency of IRAs. We also show that annuitization
alters the intergenerational welfare consequences of the reform substantially, since
it reduces accidental bequests. Finally, even if mandatory saving programs have a
clear cost advantage, they are only recommendable if consumers are myopic.
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1 Introduction
With aging populations and longer life spans, the adequacy of household savings for retire-
ment has become a major policy issue in most developed countries. As successive reforms
have reduced the generosity of public pension systems, the need for individual retirement
savings has increased during the last decades. Consequently, in order to encourage indi-
viduals to save more, many countries have provided special tax arrangements for funds
held in occupational and private pension plans. Due to diﬀerences in the design and
historical introduction of these schemes, their signiﬁcance still varies considerably across
OECD members. In countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland
or the Netherlands, which either have a long tradition or run a mandatory scheme, the ac-
cumulated assets in retirement plans already represent up to 100 percent of GDP. On the
other hand, in continental European countries such as Germany, France or Italy, which
still run a very generous public pension system, retirement assets in private plans are
below 10 percent of GDP. The enormous divergence in terms of asset size, participation
rates and program design also reﬂects the ongoing controversial economic discussion. This
paper deals at least with three issues of this debate.
First, we quantify their eﬃciency and growth eﬀects. Since the tax incentives for retire-
ment savings eﬀectively exempt or even subsidize the return from savings in these plans,
they reduce intertemporal at the cost of individual portfolio choice distortions. Conse-
quently, as the discussion in Bernheim (2002) and OECD (2004) indicates, these policies
are often considered as an expensive means of encouraging additional saving. While the
budgetary cost may even rise in the future, the bulk of contributions is diverted from
other sources of savings rather than by reducing consumption.
Second, we analyze the consequences of mandatory annuitization, which is often proposed
as a means to overcome or reduce the adverse selection problems on private annuity mar-
kets. As discussed, for example, by Finkenstein and Poterba (2002) those who purchase
an annuity are likely those who have a longer life expectancy than those who do not.
Therefore, annuity prices are too expensive for most individuals. Given this kind of mar-
ket failure, it seems obvious that individuals should be enticed into locking their funds
in a private pension plan that includes the mandatory annuitization of account balances
at retirement. However, as pointed out by Pech (2004), subsidized annuity programs
may even reduce individual old-age provision in a general equilibrium setting. In addi-
tion, individuals may be induced to overannuitize, if the low observed annuity market
participation is due to poor health or strong bequest motives, see Inkmann et al. (2007).
Finally, we discuss the issue of mandatory retirement accounts. Whereas in the standard
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neoclassical life-cycle model individuals are well informed and make the right choices for
themselves, there exists a lot of empirical evidence on people’s actual savings behavior
that does not conform with the standard model, see Bernheim and Rangel (2007) or
Mitchell and Utkus (2006). As several studies indicate, a large fraction of the population
expresses a lack of self-control which causes a gap between the own actual behavior and
the self-reported plans. If households are myopic or behave according to time-inconsistent
preferences, they value a commitment device which prevents them to consume to much
in the present. Indeed, Boeri et al. (2001, 27f.) ﬁnd that a mandatory funded pilar
has more public support among European citizens than a voluntary supplemental saving
program. However, if people are rational and liquidity constrained, mandatory programs
may increase borrowing constraints and reduce economic eﬃciency.
Various studies have already quantiﬁed the growth, distributional and eﬃciency impli-
cations of government sponsored retirement accounts with and without annuitization.
Already Engen et al. (1994) examine the eﬀectiveness of individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) in the US. Applying a partial equilibrium life-cycle model, they compute the op-
timal individual saving behavior for alternative contribution limits and withdrawal rates.
Their simulations indicate that individuals will mainly substitute from liquid savings in
the short run and increase their aggregate savings only slightly in the long run. Laibson
et al. (1998) extend this approach by considering consumers with hyperbolic discount
functions. Their analysis conﬁrms that tax-favored retirement schemes have a bigger im-
pact on hyperbolic consumers, since the latter value commitment. However, the value of
commitment for hyperbolic consumers falls in their model with rising risk aversion. Fi-
nally, Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) examine the introduction of actuarially fair annuity
products with either voluntary or mandatory contributions in an overlapping generations
model with endogenous growth. They show that full annuitization, although individually
optimal, may not be socially optimal, since it eliminates unintended bequests and slows
down capital accumulation and economic growth below the social optimum.
The present study applies a general equilibrium overlapping generations model which was
pioneered by Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and has been recently extended to include
mortality and individual income risk as well as borrowing constraints. Private annu-
ity markets are closed by assumption, so that the public sector provides partial insurance
against income and longevity risk via the progressive tax system and the unfunded pension
system1. I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (1998) evaluate in this framework the long-run consequences
of IRAs on the US capital stock for various contribution limits and tax savings instru-
1For a recent survey of this literature, see Kru¨ger (2006).
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ments. They conclude that about 9 percent of IRA contributions during the 80ies consti-
tuted additional savings which raised the US capital stock by about 6 percent. Fuster et
al. (2005) extend their framework by introducing mandatory retirement accounts into a
model with two-sided altruism where individual life expectancy and income are positively
correlated. Starting from a benchmark which reﬂects the existing US pay-as-you-go so-
cial security system, they either eliminate the existing system or substitute halve of the
contributions by mandatory savings in private accounts which are either annuitized or
not after retirement. While all reforms induce an increase in the long run capital stock
between 6 and 9 percent, the mandatory saving programs outperforms the full privati-
zation policy in terms of long-run capital and consumption growth. Fuster et al. (2005)
also examine the long run welfare eﬀects for diﬀerent household types. Not surprisingly,
households without parents alive prefer a full privatization, since young households bene-
ﬁt less from the longevity insurance while the mandatory savings increase their liquidity
constraints. On the other hand, most households with both parents and children beneﬁt
from a mandatory saving programm with annuitized pay-outs, since the parents like to
hold annuities during retirement.
Fuster et al. (2005), however, only consider the long-run equilibria. Consequently, the
reported welfare eﬀects might be simply due to intergenerational redistribution. In order
to distinguish between short and long-run growth and welfare eﬀects of the recent intro-
duction of IRAs in Germany, Fehr et al. (2006a) compute the complete transition to the
new long run equilibrium. This allows to quantify the intergenerational welfare conse-
quences and to isolate the insurance and distortionary eﬀects of the considered retirement
programs. Like the previous studies our simulations show that tax-favored accounts have
a signiﬁcant impact on long-run capital accumulation and increase the welfare of future
generations. However, the latter is mainly due to the fact that the reform will reduce
the welfare of elderly and transitional generations. Consequently, the aggregate eﬃciency
gain is almost insigniﬁcant for most realistic parameter combinations.
This study extends the previous one in various direction. First, we allow for a richer
preference structure which may include hyperbolic discounting and/or a bequest motive.
Second, we compare annuitized and non-annuitized beneﬁts at retirement. Third, we dis-
tinguish between voluntary and mandatory saving programs and include administrative
costs. Finally, we compare alternative ﬁnancing options in order to balance the govern-
ment budget. Our simulations conﬁrm the insigniﬁcant eﬃciency eﬀects of the previous
study but indicates that annuitization and hyperbolic discounting may substantially im-
prove economic eﬃciency. We also show that annuitization alters the intergenerational
welfare consequences of the reform substantially, since it reduces accidental bequests.
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Finally, even if mandatory saving programs have a clear cost advantage, they are only
recommendable if consumers are myopic.
In the next section, we describe how we model the tax and beneﬁt system and sketch
the structure of the simulation model. Section 3 explains the calibration and simulation
approach. Finally, section 4 presents the simulation results and section 5 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
2 The model economy
2.1 Demographics and intracohort heterogeneity
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals which may
live up to a maximum possible lifespan of J periods. At each date, a new generation is
born where we have normalized its size N1 = 1, i.e. we assume zero population growth.
Since individuals face lifespan uncertainty with ψj < 1 the time-invariant conditional
survival probability from age j − 1 to age j, i.e. Nj = ψjNj−1 and ψJ+1 = 0.
Our model is solved recursively. Consequently, an agent faces the state vector zj =
(j, aj, a
R
j , epj, ej) where j ∈ J = {1, . . . , J} is the household’s age, aj ∈ A = [a¯, a¯]
denotes (liquid) assets held at the beginning of age j, aRj ∈ R = [a¯
R, a¯R] denotes assets in
individual retirement accounts held at the beginning of age j, epj ∈ P = [ep, ep] deﬁnes
the agent’s accumulated earning points for public pension claims and ej ∈ Ej = [ej, ej] is
the individual productivity at age j.
Since income is uncertain the productivity state is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov
process described in more detail below. Consequently, each age-j cohort is fragmented
into subgroups ξ(zj), according to the initial distribution (i.e. at j = 1), the Markov
process and optimal decisions. Let X(zj) be the corresponding cumulated measure to
ξ(zj). Hence, ∫
A×R×P×Ej
dX(zj) = 1 for all j = 1, . . . , J
must hold, as ξ(zj) is not aﬀected by cohort sizes but only gives densities within cohorts.
In the following, we concentrate on the long run equilibrium and omit the time index t and
the state index zj for every variable whenever possible. Agents are then only distinguished
according to their age j.
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2.2 Budget constraints and bequests
The budget constraint is deﬁned as follows:
aj+1 = aj(1 + r) + wj(1− τj) + pj − sj − (1 + τz)txj(yj, sj)− (1 + τc)cj + bj (1)
with a1 = 0 and aj ≥ 0 ∀ j. In addition to interest income from savings raj, households
receive gross labor income wj = w(1− j)ej during their working period as well as public
pensions pj during retirement. As time endowment is normalized to one, j deﬁnes leisure
consumption and w the wage rate for eﬀective labor. They contribute to or withdraw from
IRAs sj and have to pay progressive income taxes txj which depend on taxable income yj
and IRA transactions sj. Income tax payments are supplemented by a surcharge at rate
τz
2. Due to a contribution ceiling the pension contribution rate τj depends on income. The
price of consumption goods cj includes consumption taxes τc and bj deﬁnes the (accidental
or intended) bequests received at age j.
IRA assets accumulate according to
aRj+1 = a
R
j (1 + rj) + min[sj, sˆ]−max[κsj, 0] with rj =
1 + r
max[ωj, ψj]
− 1 (2)
where aR1 = 0 and a
R
j ≥ 0 ∀ j. Without annuitization at age j, we set ωj = 1, so that the
survival probability ψj has no eﬀect on the individual return, i.e. rj = r. If IRA assets are
annuitized at age j, we set ωj = 0, so that the periodic returns are annuitized, i.e. rj > r.
Note that contributions cannot exceed the contribution limit sˆ. The parameter κ ≥ 0
represents special charges or administrative cost associated with contributions to these
accounts. After retirement (i.e. j ≥ jR and sj ≤ 0) we have to distinguish two cases: First,
without mandatory annuitization, retired households can decide how much to withdraw.
Second, with mandatory annuitization, retirees receive a ﬁxed beneﬁt depending on their
wealth at the beginning of retirement aRjR :
sj = −
(1 + rjR)a
R
jR∑J
j=jR
Πji=jR+1(1 + ri)
−1 . (3)
Our model abstracts from other annuity markets. Consequently, private assets and non-
annuitized IRA assets of all agents who died are aggregated and then distributed among all
working age cohorts following an exogenous age- and productivity-dependent distribution
scheme Γj(ej), i.e.
bj = Γj(ej)
J∑
i=1
(1− ψi+1)Ni
∫
A×R×P×Ei
qi+1(zi)dX(zi) for all j = 1, . . . , jR − 1, (4)
2This reﬂects the so-called solidarity surcharge in Germany.
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where qi+1(zi) = (1 + r)[ai+1(zi) + ωi+1a
R
i+1(zi)(1− τb)]. The age distribution of bequests
is computed in the initial steady state where we assume that the heirs always receive the
assets of the generation which was 25 years older. Since bequest can be received only
during employment, we adjust this rule at the beginning and at the end of employment.
Within a generation bequests are distributed proportional to the current productivity
level ej, which highlights their stochastic nature and also reﬂects empirical evidence
3.
Finally, inheritances from IRAs are due to a speciﬁc inheritance tax τb since they were
accumulated tax free.
2.3 Individual preferences and consumer welfare
As usually, the household’s preference structure is represented by a time-separable, nested
utility function. In order to isolate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, we
follow the approach of Epstein and Zin (1991) and formulate the maximization problem
of a representative consumer recursively. In addition to the traditional rational consumer
model with time-consistent preferences we also simulate an economy with hyperbolic
consumers as I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (2003). In this section, we explain the computation of
time-inconsistent preferences in detail.
Following the seminal work of Strotz (1956) the decision problem of a hyperbolic consumer
is modeled as an intrapersonal game between a sequence of “selves”with conﬂicting pref-
erences. Taking the strategies of his future selves as given the current self picks a strategy
that is optimal from his own perspective. The consumer at age j and state zj ﬁrst has
to forecast his future actions. He believes that his future self (who is at age j + 1) will
choose consumption, leisure and IRA savings in order to maximize the objective function
max
cˆj+1,ˆj+1,sˆj+1
{
u(cˆj+1, ˆj+1) + βˆδ
[
ψj+2E[Vˆ (zj+2)]
1− 1
γ + (1− ψj+2)μqˆ1−
1
γ
j+2
]} 1
1− 1γ
(5)
with
E[Vˆ (zj+2)] =
[∫
Ej+2
πj+1(ej+2|ej+1)Vˆ (zj+2)1−ηdej+2
] 1
1−η
. (6)
The parameters γ and η deﬁne the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the coeﬃ-
cient of relative risk aversion, respectively. The (believed) value function Vˆ of the future
is weighted with the survival probability ψj+2 while (believed) bequests are weighted with
the bequest motive μ and the probability to die4. The expectation operator E in (5) and
3De Nardi (2004) highlights the link between individual productivity and inheritance. Fehr et al.
(2006a) also report the consequences of alternative bequest distributions.
4See De Nardi (2004) and Inkmann et al. (2007) for a similar modeling of bequest preferences.
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(6) indicates that future utilities are computed over the distribution of ej+2, i.e. where
πj+1(·) denotes the age-dependent probability at age j+1 to experience productivity ej+2
in the next period if the current productivity is ej+1. Note that for the special case η =
1
γ
we are back at the traditional expected utility speciﬁcation, see Epstein and Zin (1991,
266).
Future utility is discounted with the time preference rates δ (long-term) and βˆ (short-
term). The literature distinguishes between so called “naive”and “sophisticated”hyperbolic
consumers, see O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). The former think that their future selves
will behave in a time-consistent manner (i.e. βˆ = 1) despite the fact that they have
consistently violated this belief in the past. The latter correctly foresee that their future
selves will also behave in a time-inconsistent way, i.e. βˆ = β where β deﬁnes the discount
rate of the current selves5. Consequently, cˆj+1, ˆj+1 and sˆj+1 denote the believes of the
current self about his future actions. The value function Vˆ (·) for future beliefs (with cˆj, ˆj
and sˆj from (5)) is computed for any age j = 2, . . . , J from
Vˆ (zj) =
{
u(cˆj, ˆj) + δ
[
ψj+1E[Vˆ (zj+1)]
1− 1
γ + (1− ψj+1)μqˆ1−
1
γ
j+1
]} 1
1− 1γ
. (7)
The current self at age j maximizes the objective function
max
cj ,j ,sj
{
u(cj, j) + βδ
[
ψj+1E[Vˆ (zj+1)]
1− 1
γ + (1− ψj+1)μqˆ1−
1
γ
j+1
]} 1
1− 1γ
. (8)
subject to the budget constraint (1) and aj+1 ≥ 0 and given his believes E[Vˆ (zj+1)] and
qˆj+1 about the behavior of his future selves. Note that the decision functions cj(zj), j(zj)
and sj(zj) denote the actual behavior of the agent. The latter are also used to compute
the welfare of the agent, i.e.
V (zj) =
{
u(cj, j) + δ
[
ψj+1E[V (zj+1)]
1− 1
γ + (1− ψj+1)μq1−
1
γ
j+1
]} 1
1− 1γ
. (9)
The time-inconsistency in preferences is evident from the fact that the β, βˆ terms appear
in the decision problems (5) and (8) but not in the calculation of the value functions
(7) and (9). It should also be clear that for β = βˆ the decision and value functions of
the beliefs cˆj, ˆj, sˆj and Vˆ coincide with the respective functions of the actual behavior
cj, j, sj and V . Consequently, sophisticated hyperbolic consumers (where β = βˆ < 1)
behave diﬀerently compared to time-consistent consumers (i.e. where β = βˆ = 1) but
the solution algorithm is quite similar. For naive hyperbolic consumers (i.e. where β < 1
5Of course, it would be no problem to consider also intermediate cases where βˆ ∈ (β, 1).
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and βˆ = 1) the decision and the respective value functions of current and future selves
do not coincide so that the computational algorithm has to be speciﬁed diﬀerently. In
the following we only report the results with naive hyperbolic consumers, since for our
calibration the results with sophisticated hyperbolic consumers are very similar6.
The period utility function is deﬁned by
u(cj, j) =
[
(cj)
1− 1
ρ + α(j)
1− 1
ρ
] 1− 1γ
1− 1ρ (10)
where ρ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure at each age j, while α deﬁnes the age-independent leisure preference parameter.
2.4 The production side
Firms in this economy use capital and labor to produce a single good according to the
Cobb-Douglas production technology Y = KεL1−ε where Y,K and L are aggregate
output, capital and labor, ε is capital’s share in production, and  deﬁnes a technology
parameter. Capital depreciates at a constant rate δk and ﬁrms have to pay corporate
taxes Tk = τk
[
Y − wL − δkK
]
where the corporate tax rate τk is applied to the output
net of labor costs and depreciation. Firms maximize proﬁts renting capital and hiring
labor from the households so that the marginal product of capital net of depreciation and
corporate taxes equals the market interest rate r and the marginal product of labor equals
the wage rate w for eﬀective labor.
2.5 The government sector
Our model distinguishes between the tax system and the pension system. In each period
the government issues new debt ΔB and collects taxes from households and ﬁrms in order
to ﬁnance general government expenditures G as well as interest payments on its debt.
Whereas government purchases of goods and services G are ﬁxed per capita, we assume
a constant debt to output ratio of 60 percent in the benchmark case. Consequently, the
long run equilibrium (i.e. where ΔB = 0) the government budget is deﬁned as
G + rB = (1 + τz)Ty + τcC + Tb + Tk, (11)
where C deﬁnes aggregate consumption (see equation (22)) and revenues of income and
bequest taxation are computed from
Ty =
J∑
j=1
Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej
txj(yj(zj), sj(zj))dX(zj)
6Of course, simulation results with sophisticated consumers are available upon request.
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and
Tb = τb
J∑
j=1
Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej
ωj+1(1− ψj+1)(1 + r)aRj+1(zj)dX(zj).
We assume that contributions to public pensions are exempted from tax while the beneﬁts
are fully taxed. Consequently, taxable gross income yj is computed from gross labor
income net of pension contributions and a ﬁxed work related allowance dw, nominal
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capital income net of a saving allowance ds and - after retirement - public pensions.
yj = max[wj(1− τj)− dw; 0] + max[r˜(aj + θ1aRj )− ds; 0] + pj. (12)
Although we consider in most simulations that interest income from IRAs is tax exempt
(i.e. θ1 = 0), we also provide for the opposite case (i.e. θ1 = 1). Given taxable income yj,
we compute the individual income tax payment from
txj(yj, sj) = T05
(
yj − θ2 min[sj − φj(sj), sˆ]
)− φj(sj) (13)
where T05(.) is the progressive tax code of 2005 in Germany. The parameter θ2 allows to
distinguish between front-loaded and back-loaded taxation of IRAs. If θ2 = 1 contribu-
tions to IRAs are tax exempt up to the contribution limit sˆ and withdrawals are subject
to taxation. On the other hand, if θ2 = 0 contributions to IRAs are from taxed income
and withdrawals are not taxed. Note that θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 0 deﬁnes a situation where
IRAs have no tax privilege compared to ordinary savings. The function
φj(sj) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0/sj if j < jR and sj ≤ 0 (liquid/illiquid accounts)
−∞ if j ≥ jR and sj > 0
0 else.
(14)
allows to distinguish between liquid and illiquid IRAs during employment and to prohibit
contributions after retirement. Before retirement (i.e. at age j < jR) withdrawals from
IRAs might not be possible, since all the money would be lost if we set φj = sj
8. After
retirement we assume a prohibitive penalty for contributions.
The pension system pays old-age beneﬁts and collects payroll contributions from wage
income below the contribution ceiling which is ﬁxed at two times the average income w¯.
Individual pension beneﬁts pj of a retiree of age j ≥ jR in a speciﬁc year are computed
7In order to reﬂect realistic features of capital income taxation in a model without inﬂation, we assume
for taxation purposes a nominal interest rate r˜, i.e. real interest rate r plus a ﬁctive inﬂation of two percent
per year. The latter exacerbates the distortions of real capital income taxation, see Feldstein (1997).
8In the following we do not consider intermediate cases with 0 < φj < sj . Of course, such an analysis
would be possible without any problem.
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from the product of his earning points epjR the retiree has accumulated at retirement and
the actual pension amount (APA) of the respective year:
pj = epjR × APA. (15)
In each year of employment, the worker receives an earning point depending on his relative
income position wj/w¯ up to the contribution ceiling. Since the latter is ﬁxed at the double
of average income w¯, the maximum earning points that could be collected per year are 2.
Accumulated earning points at age j are therefore
epj+1 = epj + min[wj/w¯; 2], (16)
with ep1 = 0.
The budget of the pension system must be balanced in every period. Consequently, the
general contribution rate τ is computed from
τ =
∑J
j=jR
Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej pj(zj)dX(zj)∑jR−1
j=1 Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej min[wj(zj); 2w¯]dX(zj)
. (17)
Note that due to the contribution ceiling the general contribution rate τ is not necessarily
identical with the individual contribution rates in the budget constraint (1). The latter
is given by
τj =
{
τ if wj ≤ 2w¯,
τ2w¯/wj if wj > 2w¯.
(18)
2.6 Equilibrium and the computational method
Given the ﬁscal policy {G,B, τk, T05(.), τz, τb, τc, τk, τ, φ, ω, sˆ}, a stationary recursive equi-
librium is a set of bequests {b(zj)}Jj=1, value functions {V (zj)}Jj=1, household decision rules
{cj(zj), j(zj), sj(zj)}Jj=1, time-invariant measures of households {ξ(zj)}Jj=1 and relative
prices of labor and capital {w, r} such that the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. given ﬁscal policy, factor prices and bequests, households’ decision rules solve the
households decision problem (8);
2. factor prices are competitive, i.e.
w = (1− ε)
(
K
L
)ε
(19)
r = (1− τk)
[
ε
(
L
K
)1−ε
− δk
]
(20)
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3. in the closed economy aggregation holds,
L =
∑
j
Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej
(1− (zj))ejdX(zj) (21)
C =
∑
j
Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej
cj(zj)dX(zj) (22)
K =
∑
j
Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej
(aj + a
R
j )dX(zj)−B (23)
Q =
∑
j
Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej
max[κsj(zj), 0]dX(zj) (24)
where Q deﬁne aggregate administrative cost of IRAs. In the small open economy
aggregate capital is derived from (20).
4. Let 1h=x be an indicator function that returns 1 if h = x and 0 if h = x. Then, the
law of motion of the measure of households is, for j ∈ J ,
ξ(zj) =
∫
A×R×P×Ej−1
1aj=aj(zj−1)×1aRj =aRj (zj−1)×1epj=epj(zj−1)πj−1(ej, ej−1)dX(zj−1).
5. bequests satisfy
jR−1∑
j=1
Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej
bj(zj)dX(zj) =
J∑
i=1
(1−ψi+1)Ni
∫
A×R×P×Ei
qi+1(zi)dX(zi). (25)
6. the government budget (11) as well as the budget of the pension system (17) are
balanced intertemporally;
7. the goods market clears, i.e.
Y = C + δkK + G + Q + NX
with NX as net exports.
The computation method follows the Gauss-Seidel procedure of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987). For the initial steady state which reﬂects the current German tax and social
security system without IRAs, we start with a guess for aggregate variables, bequests
distribution and exogenous policy parameters. Then we compute the factor prices, the
individual decision rules and value functions. The latter involves the discretization of
the state space which is explained in the appendix. Next we obtain the distribution
of households and aggregate assets, labor supply and consumption as well as the social
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security tax rate and the consumption tax (or surcharge) rate that balances government
budgets. This information allows us to update the initial guesses. The procedure is
repeated until the initial guesses and the resulting values for capital, labor, bequests and
endogenous taxes have suﬃciently converged.
Next we solve for the transition path after the introduction of IRAs. We assume that the
transition between the initial and the new ﬁnal steady state takes 4 × J periods. Given
the alternative policy parameters we assume in the ﬁrst guess that aggregate values and
bequests of the initial equilibrium remain constant along the transition. Then we update
for each period of the transition the individual and aggregate variables until we reach
convergence.
3 Calibration of the initial equilibrium
In order to reduce computational time, each model period covers ﬁve years. Agents start
life at age 20 (j = 1), are forced to retire at age 60 (jR = 9) and face a maximum
possible life span of 100 years (J = 16). The conditional survival probabilities ψj are
computed from the year 2000 Life Tables reported in Bomsdorf (2003). With respect to
the preference parameters we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ to 0.5, the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ to 0.6, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
η to 4.0 and the leisure preference parameter α to 1.5. This is within the range of
commonly used values (see Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ, 1987, or Inkmann et al., 2007) and
yields a compensated wage elasticity of labor supply of 0.3 in our benchmark. Finally,
with respect to the time preference rates β and δ we distinguish two combinations which
both yield a realistic wealth to income ratio. Following Angeletos et al. (2001, 54) we
assume that the rational consumer (i.e. β = 1) has a lower discount factor δ than the
hyperbolic consumer. In order to calibrate a realistic capital to output ratio, the discount
factor for the rational consumer is set at 0.9 which implies an annual discount rate of
about 2 percent. Next we specify for the hyperbolic consumer β = 0.75. In order to
calibrate the same capital to output ratio we have to assume δ = 1.0. Angeletos et al.
(2001, 54) report that β = 0.7 is typically measured in laboratory experiments. Figure 1
compares the discount functions and also includes a strong hyperbolic case which is used
in the sensitivity analysis.
With respect to technology parameters we chose the general factor productivity  = 1.5
in order to normalize labor income and set the capital share in production ε at 0.3. The
annual depreciation rate for capital is set at δk = 0.06. The annual APA value is currently
about 310 e. We have adjusted this amount slightly in order to derive a realistic standard
12
Figure 1: Discount functions of exponential and hyperbolic consumers
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pension9 and contribution rate for Germany. As already explained, the taxation of gross
income (from labor, capital and pensions) is close to the current German income tax code
and the marginal tax rate schedule introduced in 2005. We assume that our households
are married couples with a sole wage earner and apply the German income splitting
method. In addition, we consider a special allowance for labor income of dw = 1200 e
while for capital income the special allowance amounts to ds = 3600 e (per couple)10.
Given taxable income yj the marginal tax rate rises linearly after the basic allowance
of 7800 e from 15 percent to maximum of 42 percent when yj passes 52.000 e. In
addition to the income tax payment, households pay a surcharge at rate τz = 0.055 in the
benchmark. The consumption tax rate is set at τc = 0.17 and the corporate tax rate is
ﬁxed at τk = 0.15. Since the benchmark equilibrium is without IRAs, we set sˆ = 0.
In order to model the income process, we distinguish six productivity proﬁles across the
life cycle. Fehr (1999) has estimated ﬁve such proﬁles from data of the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP). We split up the proﬁle of the lowest income class in order
to improve the income distribution. When an agent enters the labor market (at age 20-24)
he belongs to the lowest productivity level with a probability of 10 percent, to the second
lowest again with 10 percent and to higher levels with 20 percent, respectively. After
the initial period, agents change their productivity levels according to the age-speciﬁc
Markov transition matrices which are reported in the appendix. The latter are computed
also from SOEP data for diﬀerent years between 1988 and 2003. Speciﬁcally we sorted
9The standard pension in Germany is computed for a worker who has received an average wage during
employment - i.e. epjR = jR − 1 - and amounts to roughly 60 percent of net average earnings.
10In Germany this allowance is currently 3000 e for nominal interest income, but 6000 e if the source
of capital income are dividends.
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the primary earners of the years 1988, 1993 and 1998 into seven cohorts and divided them
within each cohort into six income classes. Then we compiled for each cohort and income
class the respective income classes of its members in the surveys of the years 1993, 1998
and 2003 in order to calculate the age-speciﬁc transition matrices.
Table 1 reports the calibrated benchmark equilibria with either rational or hyperbolic
consumers and the respective ﬁgures for Germany in 2005. Both equilibria feature a closed
economy so that the interest rate is endogenous and the trade balance is zero. In addition,
we abstract from a bequest motive, i.e. μ = 0. Consequently, the reported bequest
in Table 1 are purely accidental since annuity markets are missing. The equilibrium
Table 1: The initial equilibria
Rational Naive Germany
consumers consumers 2005∗
Pension beneﬁts (% of GDP) 13.1 13.1 12.7
Pension contribution rate (in %) 19.5 19.5 19.5
Tax revenues (in % of GDP) 20.3 20.3 20.0
Average income tax rate (in %) 7.9 8.0 –
Interest rate p.a. (in %) 3.4 3.4 –
Bequest (in % of GDP) 4.3 4.0 5.2
Capital-output ratio 2.9 2.9 3.0
Gini index net income 0.296 0.298 0.299
Gini index wealth 0.540 0.544 0.613
Borrowing constraints (in %)
age 20-24 20.0 40.0
age 25-29 7.3 12.5
age 30-34 5.5 5.5
age 35-39 4.1 4.2
age 40-45 2.5 2.3
*Source: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (2006).
for hyperbolic consumers is computed with alternative values for δ and β. Of course,
hyperbolic consumers would like to consume more when they are young compared to
rational consumers. Therefore, borrowing constraints are more binding for them and the
share of constrained consumers in the two youngest cohorts increases from 20 to 40 and
from 7.3 to 12.5 percent respectively. In addition, the bequest share of GDP is reduced
slightly. The (in this case endogenous) consumption tax rate is again 17 percent. All in
all, our calibrated ﬁgures match the situation in Germany quite well.
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4 Simulation results
This section presents our simulation results when we introduce alternatively designed
IRAs into the economy described above. The subsections ﬁrst explain the modeling of our
policy reforms and the computation of their welfare and eﬃciency consequences. Then we
report the macroeconomic and welfare eﬀects of two benchmark simulations. Subsection 3
discusses the aggregate eﬃciency consequences of alternative reform designs, while the last
subsection presents some sensitivity calculations for alternative preference parameters.
4.1 Experimental design and welfare computation
In order to introduce IRAs we have to specify parameters for sˆ, φj, ωj, κ, θ1, θ2 and τb
and to decide whether contributions are mandatory or voluntary. Since our benchmark
simulation reﬂects the reform design in Germany, we assume a contribution limit which
amounts to 8 percent of average income, i.e. sˆ = 0.08w¯. In addition, we do not allow for
early withdrawals and neglect additional administrative cost, i.e. φj = sj if sj < 0 before
retirement and κ = 0.0. Finally, since we assume deferred taxation of IRAs (i.e. θ1 =
0, θ2 = 1) we tax inheritances from IRAs at τb = 0.165, which equals the average marginal
tax rate in the benchmark. As in Germany, contributions to IRAs in our benchmark are
voluntary. In the German system, individuals can chose between immediate annuitization
at the beginning of retirement (i.e. age jR) and a combination of a ﬁxed payout plan and
delayed annuitization. Since the modeling of an optimal withdrawal strategy is not the
subject of the present paper11, we simulate all considered reforms without annuitization
(i.e. ωj = 1∀ j) and with mandatory annuitization at the time of retirement (i.e. ωj = 1
if j < jR and ωj = 0 if j ≥ jR).
The introduction of IRAs aﬀects the tax revenues of the government. In order to ﬁnance
the revenue losses, we follow the German practice and eliminate the saving allowance
(i.e. ds = 0) after the reform
12 and balance the budget intertemporally by computing a
time-invariant consumption tax rate τc from
τc =
B1 +
∑∞
t=1 [G− (1 + τz)Ty,t − Tb,t − Tk,t] (1 + r)1−t∑∞
t=1 Ct(1 + r)
1−t .
The periodical budget is then balanced by the endogenous debt level, i.e.
Bt+1 = Bt(1 + r) + G− (1 + τz)Ty,t − τcCt − Tb,t − Tk,t.
11See Horneﬀ et al. (2006) or Bu¨tler and Teppa (2006) for a recent analysis of this issue.
12However, in Germany the saving allowance was only severely reduced.
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Alternatively, we also compute a time-invariant income tax surcharge τz which balances
the budget intertemporally.
Next we turn to the computation of the welfare changes. The welfare criterion which is
applied to assess a reform is ex-ante expected utility of an agent, before the productivity
level is revealed. For an agent who enters the labor market the expected utility is computed
from
E[V (z1)] =
[∫
E1
ξ(z1)V (z1)
1−ηde1
] 1
1−η
.
Note that this formulation is equivalent to (6) since we need to apply the initial distrib-
ution ξ(z1) of the productivity levels.
We assume that the reform is implemented after agents know that they have survived
but before the productivity shock is revealed. Consequently, the individual welfare eﬀect
is derived from the expected utilities in the initial equilibrium and after the reform an-
nouncement. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 87) we compute the proportional
increase in consumption and leisure (W ) which would make an agent in the baseline
scenario as well oﬀ as in the reform scenario. If the expected utility level of an age-j
individual in year t after the reform is E[V (zj,t)] and the expected utility level on the
baseline path is E[V (zj,0)], the necessary increase (decrease) in percent of initial resources
is computed from
Wj,t =
[
E[V (zj,t)]
E[V (zj,0)]
− 1
]
× 100 (26)
for individuals born before and after the reform. Consequently, a value of Wj,t = 1.0
indicates that this agent would need one percent more resources in the baseline scenario
to attain expected utility E[V (zj,t)].
In order to asses the aggregate eﬃciency consequences, we introduce a Lump-Sum Redis-
tribution Authority (LSRA) in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 65f.) as well
as Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) or Fehr et al. (2006a, b). The LSRA pays a lump-sum
transfer (or levies a lump-sum tax) to each living household in the ﬁrst period of the
transition to bring their expected utility level back to the level of the initial equilibrium.
Consequently, age-j agents who were alive in the initial equilibrium are compensated by
the transfers vj,1(Wj,1 = 0), that depend on their status in the initial equilibrium and
guaranty the initial expected utility level E[V (zj,0)]. On the other hand, those who enter
the labor market in period t of the transition receive a transfer v1,t(W1,t = W
∗) which
guaranties them an expected utility level E[V (z1,t)] = V
∗. Note that the transfers v1,t
may diﬀer among future cohorts but the expected utility level V ∗ is identical for all. The
value of the latter is chosen by requiring that the present value of all LSRA transfers is
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zero:
J∑
j=2
Nj
∫
A×R×P×Ej
vj,1(Wj,1 = 0)dX(zj) +
∞∑
t=1
v1,t(W1,t = W
∗)N1(1 + r)1−t = 0. (27)
With V ∗ > E[V (z1,0)] (i.e. W ∗ > 0), all households in period one who have lived in the
previous period would be as well oﬀ as before the reform and all current and future new-
born households would be strictly better oﬀ. Hence, the new policy is Pareto improving
after lump-sum redistributions. With V ∗ < E[V (z1,0)] (i.e. W ∗ < 0), the policy reform is
Pareto inferior after lump-sum redistributions.
4.2 Growth and welfare eﬀects of IRAs
Table 2 reports the changes in central variables after the implementation of the reform in
period 2005-2009. We distinguish the situation without and with annuitization of account
balances after retirement and compare the rational and the (naive) hyperbolic consumer
model in a small open economy.
As shown at the bottom of Table 2, the consumption tax rate remains almost constant
in all cases considered. Consequently, the elimination of saving allowances almost suﬃces
to ﬁnance the revenue shortfalls after the introduction of tax-preferred IRAs. With ratio-
nal consumers and without annuitization, savings increase in the long run by roughly 9
percent13. Additional savings are used to ﬁnance the rising public debt (which increases
by roughly 20 percent of GDP) and to build up foreign reserves which amount to 14
percent of GDP in the long run. Consequently, capital stock, labor supply and domestic
output are hardly aﬀected. The share of IRA savings in aggregate savings rises up to 50
percent. As Table 3 reveals, participation in IRAs rises strongly with age. At young ages,
only those with high incomes save in the accounts up to the contribution limit. Low and
medium income individuals face a low marginal income tax rate and have to build up
liquid precautionary savings ﬁrst. With rising age liquid precautionary savings increase
and more assets are diverted to IRAs in order to take advantage of the favorable tax
treatment14. The deferred taxation of the accounts also explains the rising public debt.
In the medium and long run the government receives higher tax revenues from retirees so
13I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (1998) ﬁnd a similar increase in the long run capital stock in the closed economy.
14Hrung (2002) shows that households ﬁrst build up precautionary savings against income uncertainty
before they invest in IRAs. On the other hand, participation rates seem to decline in many countries
before retirement, see OECD (2004, 34).
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that the temporary shortfalls could be ﬁnanced by debt. Of course, higher savings also
trigger accidental bequest which rise by more than 16 percent in the long run.
Table 2: Macroeconomic eﬀects of IRAs
Without annuitization With annuitization
rational hyperbolic rational hyperbolic
model model
Savingsa
2010-14 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.4
2015-19 0.8 0.9 0.2 -0.8
2025-29 2.2 2.4 0.3 -1.5
∞ 9.2 10.3 3.0 3.3
IRA share in savings (in %)
2010-14 5.5 6.4 6.3 6.9
2015-19 11.8 13.4 12.9 14.4
2025-29 26.0 29.0 26.1 29.8
∞ 44.9 49.3 46.0 53.6
Capital stock/Labor supply/Outputa
2005-09 0.3 0.3 -0.1 -0.4
2015-19 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8
2025-29 -0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.6
∞ -0.4 -0.3 0.4 0.5
Public debtb
2010-14 64.4 64.3 65.0 64.6
2015-19 64.7 64.6 65.7 64.8
2025-29 67.5 67.9 68.5 67.1
∞ 79.4 81.2 79.4 81.0
Bequesta
2010-14 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3
2015-19 -1.0 -0.9 -3.0 -3.5
2025-29 -0.2 0.2 -12.9 -14.8
∞ 16.4 18.8 -45.8 -48.8
Consumption tax ratec
2005- -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
aChanges are reported in percentage over initial equilibrium. bIn percent of GDP.
cIn percentage points.
The tax reform increases the tax burden for liquid precautionary savings and reduces the
tax burden for illiquid retirement savings. Since young hyperbolic consumers discount
retirement consumption less than rational consumers (see Figure 1) they react stronger
to this shift in saving incentives. Consequently, their IRA-share is higher and bequest rise
stronger than in the simulation with rational consumers.
Annuitized beneﬁts improve the insurance against longevity risk. Therefore, savings rise
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much slower than in the respective simulation without annuitization15. Since people have
an additional insurance motive to save in IRAs, the IRA-share rises compared to the
respective previous simulations. As the right part of Table 3 shows, agents reshuﬄe their
savings especially in the periods just before retirement into these IRAs. Finally, as one
would expect, annuitization reduces bequests signiﬁcantly in the long run.
Table 3: Long-run participation rate by age group (in %)a
Without annuitization With annuitization
Age sj = 0 0 < sj < sˆ sj = sˆ sj = 0 0 < sj < sˆ sj = sˆ
20-24 60 20 20 60 20 20
25-29 49 12 39 43 18 39
30-34 39 6 55 39 6 55
35-39 23 19 58 23 16 61
40-44 18 16 66 16 13 71
45-49 17 13 70 15 11 74
50-54 18 10 72 15 6 79
55-59 22 12 66 10 4 86
a Rational consumer model.
Next we consider the short- and long-run welfare eﬀects for diﬀerent generations and
income types. Table 4 compares the model with rational and hyperbolic consumers if
beneﬁts from IRAs are not annuitized. The reduction in consumption taxes improves the
welfare of all elderly retired generations slightly, since they have only small remaining
liquid assets. On the other hand, young retirees, who still have signiﬁcant private asset
holdings at the time of the reform, are burdened by the increase in capital income taxation.
Note that the welfare losses rise with incomes due to their higher saving rates and the
progressive tax system. Medium, young and future living agents beneﬁt from the tax
reductions they receive from savings in IRAs. Future generations receive higher welfare
gains due to the rising bequests. Since we compute the welfare changes of newborn and
future generations from an ex-ante perspective before their productivity is revealed, we
do not distinguish between income levels within a generation. The numbers in brackets
report the resulting welfare changes computed from an ex-post perspective. As it turns
out, the long run intragenerational welfare eﬀects are not very signiﬁcant. Next, we
compensate all existing elderly and compute an identical welfare level for all newborn
and future generations from the budget constraint (27). The aggregate eﬃciency eﬀect
15A similar eﬀect is also found by Pecchenino and Pollard (1997).
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reported in the “compensated”column is almost zero. We will discuss this in the next
section.
Table 4: Welfare eﬀects of IRAs without annuitization
Age in rational model hyperbolic model
reform consumers compen- consumers compen-
year poor median rich sated poor median rich sated
90-94 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.00
80-84 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.00
60-64 -0.05 -0.40 -0.60 0.00 -0.12 -0.51 -0.71 0.00
40-44 0.20 0.06 -0.10 0.00 0.18 -0.03 -0.14 0.00
20-24 (0.15) 0.09 (0.08) 0.04 (0.24) 0.27 (0.35) 0.19
0-4 (0.14) 0.10 (0.07) 0.04 (0.27) 0.27 (0.36) 0.19
∞ (0.28) 0.24 (0.24) 0.04 (0.42) 0.46 (0.54) 0.19
aChanges are reported in percentage of initial resources.
The welfare gains (losses) for all existing generations are smaller (higher) in the hyperbolic
consumer model. Since the elderly cannot beneﬁt from the tax incentives, the increased
taxation of capital income further increases their present bias which in turn dampens
welfare. Newborn and future generations, however, are better of in the hyperbolic model
than in the rational model. On the one side savings rise stronger which increases inter-
generational transfers via accidental bequest. In addition, IRAs provide a commitment
technology for hyperbolic agents, since they cannot withdraw from the accounts before
retirement. The latter also explains the rise in the aggregate eﬃciency gain reported in
the last column of Table 4.
Table 5: Welfare eﬀects of IRAs with annuitization
Age in rational model hyperbolic model
reform consumers compen- consumers compen-
year poor median rich sated poor median rich sated
90-94 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
80-84 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
60-64 -0.08 -0.44 -0.63 0.00 -0.26 -0.64 -0.82 0.00
40-44 1.31 1.07 0.49 0.00 1.98 1.32 0.50 0.00
20-24 (0.41) 0.40 (0.50) 0.33 (1.14) 1.30 (1.53) 1.63
0-4 (-0.17) -0.21 (-0.15) 0.33 (0.53) 0.68 (0.87) 1.63
∞ (-0.57) -0.62 (-0.67) 0.33 (0.17) 0.30 (0.39) 1.63
aChanges are reported in percentage of initial resources.
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Finally, we turn in Table 5 to the welfare changes when we annuitize the beneﬁts after
retirement. Note that in the rational model welfare consequences for elderly are almost
the same as in the previous Table 4. Of course, those who are already retired at the time of
the reform cannot take advantage of the annuitized accounts since they are not allowed to
save there any more. However, medium-aged individuals now gain substantially more than
before due to the longevity insurance provision provided by the IRAs. Finally, newborn
and future generations are worse of compared to the situation without annuitization and
compared to the initial equilibrium before the reform. These generations also beneﬁt
from the insurance provision and the tax beneﬁts, but they are hurt by the dramatic
reduction of intergenerational transfers from their parents. The introduction of annuities
implicitly redistributes income from future generations towards current living ones since
the remaining assets of the deceased are not bequeathed to their descendants but to
the remaining members of their own generation. Aggregate eﬃciency, however, increases
substantially due to the insurance provision of the new system.
Turning to the right part of Table 5 we note ﬁrst that now hyperbolic pensioners without
private assets are hardly eﬀected by the reform since the consumption tax rate remains
almost the same, see Table 2. The stronger welfare increase for medium and younger indi-
viduals is due to the fact that annuitized accounts work as a much stronger commitment
device than non-annuitized accounts. Hyperbolic agents who can take advantage of that
are therefore much better oﬀ. Of course, the latter also explains why the eﬃciency gain
in the last column rises strongly.
4.3 Eﬃciency eﬀects of IRAs
In order to get a better intuition for the aggregate eﬃciency eﬀects reported in the two
previous tables, we discuss in this section the results of alternative reform designs, which
share the same initial equilibria of Table 1. In simulation (1) we simply eliminate the
saving allowance without introducing IRAs and adjust either the consumption tax or
the surcharge rate in order to balance the intertemporal budget. The consumption tax
rate falls by 1.9 percentage points, whereas due to the smaller tax base the surcharge
rate has to be reduced by 22.1 percentage points (i.e. it turns negative). In the present
model with income uncertainty a move from consumption to progressive income taxation
increases economic eﬃciency due to the improved insurance properties of the tax system,
see Nishiyama and Smetters (2005). The aggregate eﬃciency gain is substantially smaller
when the surcharge rate is adjusted, since a lower surcharge rate directly reduces tax
progressivity. Hyperbolic agents already suﬀer from a consumption bias towards the
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present. This distortion is further increased after the elimination of the saving allowance,
so that aggregate eﬃciency either turns negative or is close to zero.
Table 6: Aggregate eﬃciency eﬀects of IRAs∗
rational hyperbolic
IRA designb model model
Simulation manda- endogenous tax
number sˆ φa κ θ1 θ2 tory τc τz τc τz
1. ds = 0
(1) 0.0 – – – – – 0.47 0.16 -0.09 0.02
2. IRA without annuitization
(2) ∞ 0.0 -0.60 -0.64 0.14 -0.75
(3) ∞ -0.04 0.12 1.00 0.82
(4) 0.08w¯ sj 0.0 0.0 1.0 no 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.22
(5) 0.04w 0.28 0.12 0.13 0.18
(6) 0.04w yes -0.35 -0.46 -0.07 -0.01
(7) 0.04w 1.0 0.0 yes -0.11 -0.40 -0.11 -0.02
3. IRA with annuitization
(8) ∞ 0.0 0.82 1.22 4.68 4.15
(9) ∞ 1.19 1.36 5.09 5.03
(10) 0.08w¯ sj 0.0 0.0 1.0 no 0.33 0.32 1.63 1.60
(11) 0.04w 0.36 0.23 0.75 0.78
(12) 0.04w yes -0.17 -0.27 0.66 0.70
(13) 0.04w 0.12 0.03 -0.12 0.18 0.21
∗In percent of remaining resources. a For j < jR.
aIf not stated otherwise, IRA parameters are identical to the benchmark in (4) or (10).
In all following simulations we keep the full taxation of ordinary asset returns. In Sim-
ulation (2) we introduce tax-favored accounts without a contribution limit which have
the same liquidity as ordinary accounts. Consequently, this reform is just the opposite
of the previous one since it eﬀectively eliminates capital income taxation16. For ratio-
nal consumers, the switch to consumption taxation reduces savings distortions but also
decreases the insurance properties of the tax system. Since the latter eﬀect dominates,
aggregate eﬃciency is reduced. Hyperbolic consumers value the reduction of intertempo-
ral distortions stronger. Therefore, the positiv eﬀect dominates the negative one so that
they experience a slight eﬃciency gain. A higher surcharge rate increases the distortions
16Note, however, that such a reform is only equivalent to an elimination of capital income taxation (i.e.
ds = ∞) with proportional income taxes and unlimited tax rebates for negative taxable income.
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of labor supply and improves the insurance provision of the tax system. As it seems, the
former eﬀect dominates and aggregate eﬃciency is reduced for rational and hyperbolic
consumers.
In simulation (3) we eliminate the liquidity of the IRAs, but keep the unlimited contribu-
tion assumption17. Consequently, we eﬀectively separate the taxation of capital income
according to the savings motive. While liquid assets which are held for precautionary
motives are taxed, illiquid assets which are held for old-age are not taxed (or even sub-
sidized). Since precautionary savings have a lower elasticity than old-age savings (see
Bernheim, 2002, 1199), this tax discrimination improves economic eﬃciency compared
to simulation (2) in all cases considered18. Hyperbolic consumers realize an additional
gain since the IRAs provide now a commitment device for them which improves eﬃciency
compared to simulations (1) and (2).
Finally, simulation (4) introduces contribution limits so that we arrive at our benchmark
parametrization. The results for the endogenous consumption tax are in bold numbers
since they were already reported above. On ﬁrst sight it seems counterintuitive that the
contribution limit even improves aggregate eﬃciency for rational consumers when the con-
sumption tax is endogenous. However, compared to simulation (3) we proceed now one
step further in direction to simulation (1) which yielded the highest eﬃciency gains. Com-
pared to simulation (3), hyperbolic consumers experience a signiﬁcant eﬃciency reduction
since their access to the commitment device is now severely restricted.
Next we introduce mandatory contributions in our model. However, in order to facilitate
comparison of the eﬃciency eﬀects between mandatory and voluntary contributions, we
assume ﬁrst in simulation (5) that the contribution limit is reduced to 4 percent of indi-
vidual incomes up to the income ceiling 2w¯. For very rich households this has no eﬀect,
but for low income individuals, this might severely restrict their contribution choices com-
pared to the benchmark (4). As one can see, this restriction improves overall eﬃciency
compared to the benchmark in the rational consumer model and reduces overall eﬃciency
slightly in the hyperbolic consumer model. Again, the restriction of contributions is eﬃ-
ciency increasing since we move further in direction to simulation (1). In addition, since
the contribution limit depends on own labor income, the current set-up works as a la-
bor supply incentive, so that employment considerably increases compared to simulation
(4). Of course, this labor supply eﬀect also works in the case of hyperbolic individuals.
17Note that this reform design might also reﬂect retirement accounts with non-binding contribution
limits for most savers, such as Ru¨rup accounts in Germany or 401(k) plans in the US.
18However, at least for rational consumers it is still more eﬃcient to tax all capital income, see simu-
lation (1).
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However, here the negative eﬀect from the stricter contribution limit dominates.
In simulation (6) and (7) we introduce mandatory saving accounts. While we retain the
savings incentives in simulation (6), we completely eliminate the latter in simulation (7).
Not surprisingly, mandatory programs reduce overall eﬃciency for rational individuals,
since they behave already optimal with a voluntary program. Now they are forced to save
when they are liquidity constrained which reduces aggregate eﬃciency. Note, however,
that the welfare reductions from simulation (5) to (6) are much smaller for hyperbolic
individuals. Of course, the negative liquidity eﬀect also works for them, but hyperbolic
consumers don’t save adequate with a voluntary program. Consequently, mandatory pro-
grams induce also a positive eﬃciency eﬀect for them. Finally, we eliminate tax privileges
in simulation (7) so that contributions are from already taxed income and interest in-
come from the IRA account is subject to taxation. For rational consumers, this yields a
substantial improvement of overall eﬃciency compared to simulation (6). The diﬀerence
between simulations (6) and (1) is now only due to stronger binding liquidity constraints.
Next we turn to annuitized accounts after retirement. In order to compare the outcomes
with and without annuitization, we repeat the previous simulation exercises. Again, we
start in simulation (8) with the assumption that contributions to and withdrawals from
IRAs are completely ﬂexible before retirement. After retirement, all wealth held in the
account has to be transferred into an annuity contract. Since annuities provide an in-
surance against longevity which is missing in the benchmark, it is not surprising that
aggregate eﬃciency rises strongly compared to simulation (2). Note, however that the
eﬃciency gains are now much stronger for hyperbolic individuals, since the annuity pro-
vides a commitment device for them. As before, the elimination of liquidity in simulation
(9) improves aggregate eﬃciency compared to (8) since it allows a separate taxation of
precautionary and old-age savings. However, the positive eﬃciency eﬀects of the tax sep-
aration are now smaller than before, since people have a much stronger preference for the
accounts which (implicitly) reduces the elasticity of old-age savings. The introduction of
a contribution limit for annuitized accounts in the benchmark (10) has now – in contrast
to the simulation (4) above – a strong negative impact on aggregate eﬃciency, since now
the access to the welfare improving annuity market is restricted.
Similarly, the introduction of a individualized contribution limit in simulation (11) now
reduces aggregate eﬃciency in the hyperbolic model substantially, since especially hy-
perbolic agents value the provision of the accounts and they are severely restricted by
the reduced limit. In the last two simulations we compare the impact of administrative
cost diﬀerences between mandatory and voluntary systems. As above, simulation (12)
introduces a mandatory contribution system where 4 percent of the income has to be con-
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tributed to an IRA. As above, aggregate eﬃciency is reduced compared to simulation (11).
In simulation (13) we return to the voluntary contribution system but assume that 12
percent of contributions are either wasted for additional administrative cost or constitute
a load factor due to adverse selection19. Our idea is that a mandatory system would work
without such a waste of resources, since all individuals would be compulsory insured.
Of course, both simulations yield a lower eﬃciency gain as the comparable simulation
(11). Note however, that in the hyperbolic model the mandatory system outperforms the
voluntary contribution system with administrative cost.
This should suﬃce to get a basic intuition of the derived eﬃciency consequences. In
the following subsection we alter the parametrization of our model in order to test the
robustness of the derived results.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
While the previous subsection has presented various simulations which all started from
the same initial equilibrium reported in Table 1, the simulations of this subsection all start
from a diﬀerent initial equilibrium due to changes in the preference parameters. Due to
space constraints Table 7 reports only the aggregate eﬃciency consequences without and
with mandatory annuitization. For better comparison, the ﬁrst line in each part presents
again the already explained results from the respective benchmark simulation.
Comparing the results of the sensitivity simulations with the respective benchmark values
we ﬁrst note that the aggregate eﬃciency eﬀects in the upper part (i.e. without annuitiza-
tion) are surprisingly robust. Only when we increase the degree of myopia in simulation
(4e) aggregate eﬃciency increases signiﬁcantly in the hyperbolic model since the value
of the commitment technology rises. With mandatory annuitization, parameter changes
have signiﬁcant eﬀects since the accounts are much more attractive and have a stronger
impact on individuals and the economy. When we introduce in simulation (10a) an ad-
ditional (so called “warm glow”or “joy of giving”) bequest motive, aggregate eﬃciency
is reduced compared to the benchmark (10) since the longevity insurance provision has
a lower value to agents. Since the reform improves the insurance provision of the tax
system (due to the taxation of ordinary capital income), the aggregate eﬃciency gains are
smaller with risk neutral individuals in simulation (10b).
Overall, the considered reform introduces distortions in the portfolio allocation and in-
creases the existing labor supply distortions, while long-run intertemporal distortions are
19Mitchell et al. (1989) report that such a load factor is very plausible for the U.S. Von Gaudecker and
Weber (2004) report similar ﬁndings for the German private annuity market.
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis∗
Simulation Preference parameters rational hyperbolic
number μ η γ ρ model model
1. IRA without annuitization
(4) 0.0 4.0 0.5 0.6 0.04 0.19
(4a) 0.7 -0.03 0.10
(4b) 0.0 -0.08 0.02
(4c) 0.33 0.06 0.10
(4d) 0.2 0.05 0.16
(4e) β = 0.6, δ = 1.1 – 0.70
2. IRA with annuitization
(10) 0.0 4.0 0.5 0.6 0.33 1.63
(10a) 0.7 0.10 0.48
(10b) 0.0 0.04 1.11
(10c) 0.33 0.01 0.83
(10d) 0.2 0.66 2.07
(10e) β = 0.6, δ = 1.1 – 3.90
∗In percent of remaining resources. τc endogenous.
dampened. Consequently, the reduction of the intertemporal substitution elasticity in
simulation (10c) yields a lower aggregate eﬃciency gain compared to the benchmark. For
the same reasoning, the reduction of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution in simula-
tion (10d) increases aggregate eﬃciency compared to the benchmark. Finally and as one
would expect, stronger myopia improves aggregate eﬃciency the most with mandatory
annuitization.
5 Discussion
We can sum up the economic consequences of tax-favored retirement accounts ﬁnanced
by capital income taxation with the following conclusions. First, such a reform has a
substantial impact on aggregate savings. For our central parametrization, the latter rise
by roughly 3 percent in the long run when accounts are annuitized and by about 10 per-
cent when they are not. Annuitized accounts reduce long-run accidental bequest and,
consequently, savings of younger generations are dampened. Second, the considered re-
form is welfare reducing for future generations in the rational model with annuitization.
In all other cases considered, long-run welfare increases by about 0.2-0.5 percent of in-
dividual resources. Third, the benchmark reform yields an aggregate eﬃciency gain in
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all considered settings. This is mainly due to the provision of a longevity insurance and
the provision of a commitment device. Consequently, the strongest aggregate eﬃciency
gains of our benchmark amounts to 1.6 percent of aggregate resources when IRAs are
annuitized and consumers are hyperbolic. Forth, it turns out that a reduced liquidity of
tax-favored accounts does not necessary reduce aggregate eﬃciency. This is due to the
fact that the reduced liquidity allows a separate taxation of diﬀerent saving motives which
improves economic eﬃciency. Fifth, eﬃciency eﬀects are very robust without mandatory
annuitization. In the other case, they are reduced signiﬁcantly when a bequest motive is
introduced and when individuals exhibit a low risk aversion and a low intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. On the other hand, a lower intratemporal elasticity of substitution
increases aggregate eﬃciency gains.
Of course, the already reported simulations could be extended in various directions. For
example, we could already annuitize the savings in the accounts before retirement or allow
(as in Germany) to split between a lump-sum and an annuitized withdrawal at time of
retirement. Both extensions have been implemented in the present model, but they have
only very minor eﬀects on aggregate eﬃciency. Similarly, we have simulated the model in
a closed economy without signiﬁcant changes in aggregate eﬃciency. Of course, it is also
possible to model special incentive schemes for low income households (see Fehr et al.,
2006a) and to combine IRAs together with substantial reductions in the unfunded public
pension system. Fehr et al. (2006b) ﬁnd for most cases considered substantial eﬃciency
losses from full privatization of public pensions in the present model. Consequently, policy
reforms which combine a partial privatization with the introduction of IRAs will tend to
have insigniﬁcant eﬃciency eﬀects.
Other interesting extensions are more complex to implement. For example, the present
paper has compared the eﬃciency consequences of alternative tax regimes for capital
income, but it has not derived an optimal tax structure. Due to the diﬀerent elasticities
of alternative saving motives it should be possible to show that a higher taxation of
precautionary savings is optimal. Such an analysis of optimal capital income taxation,
which also considers the optimal progressivity of the income tax and pension system, is
left to future research.
Appendix A: Computational method
In order to compute a solution we have to discretize the state space. The state of
a household is determined by zj = (j, aj, a
R
j , epj, ej) ∈ J × A × R × P × Ej where
J = {1, . . . , J}, A = {a1, . . . , anA}, R = {aR,1, . . . , aR,nR}, P = {ep1, . . . , epnP } and
Ej = {e1j , . . . , enEj } are discrete sets. In this paper we use J = 16, nA = nR = 12, nP = 5
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and nE = 6, but we have also simulated the model with more grid points without
signiﬁcant consequences for the reported results. The initial values for eﬃciencies are:
ξ(1, 0, 0, 0, e11) = ξ(1, 0, 0, 0, e
2
1) = 0.1 and ξ(1, 0, 0, 0, e
3
1) = · · · = ξ(1, 0, 0, 0, e61) = 0.2.
For all these possible states zj we compute the optimal decision of households from (8).
The pension grid is equidistant while the asset grid has increasing intervals between two
grid points. This is useful since the value function is heavily curved for low values of
assets. Since u(cj, j) is not diﬀerentiable in every (cj, j) and V (zj+1) is only known in a
discrete set of points zj+1 ∈ {j+1}×A×R×P ×Ej, this maximization problem can not
be solved analytically. Therefore we have to use the following numerical maximization
and interpolation algorithms to compute households optimal decision:
1. Compute (8) in age J for all possible zJ . Notice that V (zJ+1) = 0 and households are
not allowed to work anymore. Hence, in the optimum households should consume
everything they have. If they have a bequest motive, they only have to decide how
much they want to bequeath.
2. For j = J − 1, . . . , 1:
Find (8) for all possible zj by using Powell’s algorithm (Press et. al., 2001, 406ﬀ.).
Since this algorithm requires a continuous function, we have to interpolate V (zj+1).
Having computed the data V (zj+1) for all zj+1 ∈ {j+1}×A×R×P ×Ej in the last
step, we can now ﬁnd a function spj+1 which satisﬁes the interpolation conditions
spj+1(j + 1, a
k
j+1, a
R,l
j+1, ep
m
j+1) = EV (zj+1) (28)
for all k = 1, . . . , nA, l = 1, . . . , nR and m = 1, . . . , nP . In this paper we use
multidimensional cubic spline interpolation, i.e. spj : S3 × S3 × S3 → R, whereas
S3 is the space of all one-dimensional, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, piecewise
third-order polynomial functions and S3 × S3 × S3 is its tensor product (cf. Judd
(1998, 225ﬀ.)). Further information is available upon request. The multidimensional
cubic spline interpolation allows a reduction of nA, nR and nP to only a few points
with the same accuracy as multidimensional line interpolation. Therefore, in this
paper we have set nA = 12.
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Appendix B: Markov transition matrices
Age dependent Markov transition matrices
Age 20-24 Age 25-29
Future productivity level Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.30 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.31 0.17 0.22 0.08 0.10 0.11
2 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.13 0.10 0.11
Current 3 0.07 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.33 0.25 0.14 0.09
productivity 4 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.33 0.22 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.31 0.22 0.09
level 5 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.34 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.24
6 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.46
Age 30-34 Age 35-39
Future productivity level Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.37 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.05
2 0.18 0.25 0.30 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.12 0.03 0.02
Current 3 0.09 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.38 0.20 0.09 0.05
productivity 4 0.07 0.06 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.40 0.22 0.07
level 5 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.24 0.38 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.44 0.22
6 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.23 0.58 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.63
Age 40-44 Age 45-49
Future productivity level Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.49 0.24 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.45 0.26 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.01
2 0.17 0.31 0.36 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.32 0.33 0.14 0.03 0.03
Current 3 0.07 0.13 0.40 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.44 0.27 0.07 0.02
productivity 4 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.40 0.29 0.06
level 5 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.47 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.46 0.20
6 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.66 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.70
Age 50-54
Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.42 0.22 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.04
2 0.14 0.30 0.35 0.11 0.06 0.04
Current 3 0.11 0.12 0.37 0.25 0.11 0.03
productivity 4 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.41 0.24 0.07
level 5 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.45 0.19
6 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.66
Source: Authors’ own calculations from 1988-2003 SOEP data
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